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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Fifth Judicial
District

Court

of

Washington

following a bench trial.

County,

Utah

in

a

civil

case

The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j) , but transferred this case
to the Court of Appeals.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) .

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Leon Sprouse obtained a judgment and foreclosed on a motel
he had sold to Arjen Jager under a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Artie Edmunds, the real estate agent who brought the parties
together, held an assignment of a $25f000.00 interest in the
Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract

counterclaimed for payment.

(UREC)

for

the

commission

and

Third-party plaintiffs (Edmunds, his

broker, and broker company) sued Leon Sprouse for the real estate
commission earned in connection with the sale.

Trial was held

July 1, 1988 and the Court entered judgment against Sprouse for
$33,239.46, finding liability for the commission and attorney's
fees, and finding that the assignment of an interest in the UREC
entitled the holder to share in the proceeds from the sheriff's
sale,

and

that

the

holder, under

entitled to priority.

the

facts

presented, was

After several unsuccessful post-judgment

motions, Sprouse now appeals the Court's ruling.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Sprouse raises four issues in his appeal brief claiming that
(1) a modification of a contract for a real estate commission
does not need to be in writing and does not need to be signed by
the real estate broker; (2) the great weight of the evidence
showed that the real estate agent consented

and agreed to a

modification that relieved Sprouse of personal liability for the
commission if Arjen Jager, the purchaser, defaulted;
trial

court

erred

in enforcing

the

"Note"

portions of the "NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNMENT"

and

(3) the

"Assignment"

(hereinafter "NAA")

document that only Sprouse signed, while refusing to enforce the
"Agreement" portion that purported to relieve Sprouse of personal

liability

for

the

commission;

and

(4)

that

the

award

of

attorney's fees is not supported by the evidence.
Respondents contest these issues and present the following
points:
1.

Assuming, arguendo, that Sprouse is correct on his first

three issues, the judgment should still be affirmed because:
A.

Sprouse

has

acknowledged

liability

for

the

commission.
B.

The

judgment

was

also

based

upon

Sprouse fs

assignment to Interwest Commercial Properties (hereinafter "ICP")
of an undivided $25,000.00 interest in the Uniform Real Estate
Contract (UREC), entitling Artie Edmunds, the holder, to share in
the proceeds.
C.

The assignee (ICP/Edmunds) of a partial assignment

of payments owed under the UREC
payment

over

the

assignor

is entitled

(Sprouse),

documents manifest the parties1

to priority in

especially

where

the

intent to pay the commission

first.
2.

The statute of frauds applies to the NAA insofar as it

attempts to modify the broker's written commission agreement and
the

broker

is

the

party

to

be

charged

when

the

landowner

(Sprouse) alleges an oral agreement that reduces or eliminates
the landowner's liability for a commission.
3.

Marshalling of the disputed

trial evidence shows an

adequate basis to support the trial court's finding that the
parties did not mutually agree to modify the written commission
agreement

so

as

to

relieve

Sprouse

of

liability

if

Jager

defaulted.

Therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to

enforce a term of the NAA that, upon disputed evidence, the court
found had not been mutually agreed upon.
4.

The award of attorney's fees was adequately supported by

the evidence.
the

Alternatively, Sprouse cannot attack that part of

judgment

on

appeal

because

he

and

the

court

accepted

a

proffer as to reasonableness of the fees and did not challenge
the fees at trial, and cannot do so for the first time on appeal.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(5), as in effect at the times in

issue, provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith:
• • • •

(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation.
2.
follows:

Utah

Rules

of

Evidence,

Rule

103(a) (1)

provides

as

(a)
Effect of erroneous ruling.
Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1)
Objection.
In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion
to strike appears of record, stating the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground was
not apparent from the context; or
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.
This is a civil case to enforce a written agreement for a

real estate commission and to enforce a note and an assignment of
A

an interest in a Uniform Real Estate Contract given to secure the
commission on the sale of a motel in St. George, Utah.

B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below.
Leon Sprouse filed a complaint against Arjen Jager September

10, 1986 after Jager defaulted under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract on the motel purchased from Sprouse.

(R. vol. I, pp.

Sprousefs Second Amended Complaint filed December 9, 1986

1-7.)

sought a judicial

foreclosure

against Jager

and

named Artie

Edmunds as a defendant because Edmunds claimed certain rights as
the holder of the NAA, and requested an adjudication of Edmund's
alleged interest.
against

Sprouse

(R. vol. I, pp. 93-103.)
for

rescission,

Jager counterclaimed

alleging

that

Sprouse

made

fraudulent representations to induce him to purchase the motel,
and

requested

$85,000.00

refunded

for

the

value

of

three

properties given to Sprouse as the down payment and another
$100,000.00 for improvements he made to the motel property prior
to his default.

Jager also filed a cross-claim against Edmunds

alleging misrepresentation as the sales agent in the transaction.
(R. vol. I, pp. 107-120.)

Edmunds filed a counterclaim against

Sprouse claiming a $25,000.00 interest in the UREC as the holder
of the NAA and the right to participate in the foreclosure and
asserted a priority right to payment.

Edmunds also cross-claimed

against Jager for foreclosure of his interest in the UREC.
vol. I, pp. 126-134.)

(R.

Sprouse answered Edmunds counterclaim,

admitting the assignment and Edmunds right to participate in the

R

foreclosure to protect his interest in the UREC.

(R. vol. I, pp.

143-145.)
On September 29, 1987, a motion to intervene (R. vol. II,
pp. 31-32) was made by Interwest Commercial Properties (ICP) and
Roy Larsen, as the licensed real estate broker for ICP, in order
to maintain an action for the commission.

On October 14, 1987,

during a summary judgment hearing, the court granted the motion
(R. vol. I, pp. 290-291), and the third-party complaint was filed
October 22, 1987

(R. vol. II, pp. 83-90), seeking a judgment

against Sprouse for the commission.

Sprouse eventually answered

the third-party complaint and filed a counterclaim alleging that
Edmunds had misrepresented Jager's financial ability to him.

(R.

vol. II, pp. 111-120.)
In

the

main

action, the

court

granted

partial

summary

judgment at the October 14, 1987 hearing, and on November 5,
1987, findings of fact and conclusions of law, along with a
judgment

and

decree

of

foreclosure, were

entered.

Jager's

claims, and claims between Sprouse and Edmunds, as well as the
intervention

claims

adjudication.

of

ICP,

were

all

(R. vol. II, pp. 92-99.)

reserved

for

later

The UREC was foreclosed

at a sheriff's sale held December 10, 1987, and sold to Leon
Sprouse for his bid of $360,000.00.

(R. vol. II, pp. 102-103.)

Shortly

stipulated

before

trial, the

parties

to

reduce

the

attorney's fees portion of the judgment against Jager, and to
dismiss the remaining claims made by or against Jager, and the
court entered orders to carry out the stipulations.
pp. 188-195.)

(R. vol. II,

Trial of the remaining claims was held July 1,

6

1988.

The

plaintiffs

court
and

found

against

the

issues

Sprouse.

in

The

favor

court

of

third-party

eventually

entered

Reinstated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Reinstated
Judgment on July
delays

were

12, 1989.

caused

by

the

(R. vol. Ill, pp. 147-155.)
court's

request

for briefs

The

before

ruling, the withdrawal of Sprouse's trial counsel, time for new
counsel

to

obtain

a

trial

transcript,

and

the

filing

of

post-trial motions such as objections to the findings, motion for
new trial, and the like.
Sprouse has timely appealed from the final judgment entered
on July 12, 1989.

C.

Statement Of Facts.
This action arises out of a sale of the Oasis Motel in St.

George, Utah by Leon Sprouse to Arjen Jager on a Uniform Real
Estate Contract (UREC).
Artie
Commercial
listed

Edmunds, a
Properties

for sale and

real

estate

sales

(Tr. 77) , knew that

agent

for

the motel

Interwest
had

been

that Sprouse would pay a commission

(Tr.

78-79) , so that when Arjen Jager contacted him

(Tr. 81) about

acquiring a motel, he showed Jager the outside of the Oasis Motel
(Tr. 81-82) . When Jager expressed an interest, Edmunds contacted
Sprouse (Tr. 8 3 ) , and Sprouse said he would look at an offer (Tr.
84).

Jager made an offer of purchase involving trading several

of Jagerfs interests in other properties as the down payment.
Edmunds hand-delivered the offer to Sprouse at his home in Las

7

Vegas

(Tr. 87) .

Sprouse would not accept the offer until he

inspected the trade properties.
Edmunds and Sprouse met in Salt Lake City and together
examined

the trade properties

(Tr. 88-89) .

Jager

modify his offer to meet Sprouse1 s objections

agreed to

(Tr. 90, 197,

200-201), and on March 11, 1985, Edmunds travelled to Sprouse's
home again to present Jagerfs second offer of $475,000.00, which
Sprouse accepted (Tr. 91-92, 167).
This Earnest Money Sales Agreement (EMSA) is Trial Exhibit
No. 2.

It was for $475,000.00, with $85,000.00 being allowed for

Jager's equity in an assignment of contract ($50,000.00), Salt
Lake duplex

($25,000.00), and Salt Lake home ($10,000.00), and

with the balance of $390,000.00 to be paid on a contract (Tr.
47-49).

It contains a section setting forth the agreement for

payment of the real estate commission, which Sprouse would not
sign until it was changed from a 6% commission (or $28,500.00) to
a $25,000.00 commission

(Tr. 92-93, 193).

It also contains a

provision for attorney's fees (paragraph B, page 3 and R. vol.
II, p. 88).
Edmunds testified that it was understood that the commission
would be paid on a deferred payment schedule because Sprouse
would not receive any cash at closing to cover the commission
(Tr. 93). Sprouse acknowledges this understanding, but testified
that Edmunds also agreed, before he signed the EMSA, that if
Jager subsequently defaulted, there would be no further payments
on the commission
(Tr.

118)

and

(Tr. 193) .

testified

Edmunds disputed that testimony

that he never

8

agreed

to

forgo the

commission if Jager defaulted because his broker was adamantly
against anything like that (Tr. 118).

Poy Larsen, the broker,

testified that he never agreed to forgo the commission if Jager
defaulted and never authorized Edmunds to make any such agreement
(Tr. 26, 42), that he has never, in any transaction, agreed to
forgo a commission if the buyer defaulted (Tr. 42), and that he
has never seen such a transaction

(Tr. 36) .

president of the Washington

Board

County

Claudia Ashby,

of Realtors

and a

Director of the Utah Association of Realtors, was accepted by the
court as an expert witness (Tr. 18) , and testified that although
about

10% of

real estate

closings

involve

some deferral of

commission payments, usually with a note (Tr. 19), she had never
seen

an

agreement

where

the

obligation

to

pay

a

deferred

commission was conditioned upon the buyer's payments (Tr. 20).
The transaction closed on Friday, March 29, 1985 in St.
George.

All the closing documents were prepared by James Ivins

of Meridian Title Company at the request of Jager (Tr. 48, 211),
since he had previously done work for Jager and was familiar with
Jager1s Salt Lake properties (Tr. 212). Among the many (Tr. 218)
closing documents prepared by Ivins were Trial Exhibits 3 through
15.

Exhibit

Sprouse

and

3 is a Uniform Real Estate Contract signed by
Jager

showing

the

price

of

$475,000.00, with

$85,000.00 credit for exchange of properties, and a balance of
$390,000.00.

Sprouse testified that he reduced the commission to

$25,000.00 on the EMSA (Tr. 193) because he wanted $450,000.00
for the property and told Edmunds he'd have to put his commission
on top of that (Tr. 196) . Accordingly, Sprouse acknowledged that

9

the $475,000.00 price and the $390,000.00 contract balance both
include the $25,000.00 commission.
Ivins

prepared

a

NOTE/AGREEMENT/ASSIGNMENT

(NAA),

Trial

Exhibit No. 15, to cover this $25,000.00 commission.

The NAA is

the primary focus of the controversy in this action.

It is only

signed by Sprouse.
Ivins,

called

as

a

witness

by

Sprouse,

testified

that

Edmunds called him on March 14, 1985 and gave him information,
some of which pertained to the commission, and that he prepared
the NAA based on information obtained
call and from a note he received
(Tr. 237).

from Edmunds during

the

from Edmunds after that call

Ivins testified that in the note Edmunds "reiterated

the basic terms of the payment of the real estate commission"
(Tr. 220-221).

During cross-examination Mr. Ivins produced the

written note he received
Trial Exhibit No. 24

from Edmunds, and it was received as

(Tr. 235-236) .

Ivins then admitted

that

there was nothing in Exhibit No. 24 to support the second to last
paragraph of the NAA (Exhibit No. 15), but that he included this
paragraph

based

upon

his

recollection

of

the

prior

telephone

conversation with Edmunds on March 14, 1985 (Tr. 238-239).

Ivins

admitted having telephone conversations with Mr. Jager (Tr. 211,
240) and Mr. Sprouse (Tr. 223, 241) prior to the time he prepared
the NAA, and testified that in this complicated transaction, he
was generally getting information from lots of different places
and people, and that when he drafted the agreement, it was the
culmination of all the

facts that had been given to him

240) .

10

(Tr.

Edmunds testified that he called Mr. Ivins about March 13,
1985f and, regarding the commission, told Mr. Ivins that it would
be a deferred commission over four years at the same interest
rate as the contract on the motel, that it was to be secured by
the property, and that ICP was to have the right to step in and
take over the contract (Tr. 104-105) , but testified he did not
tell

Mr.

Ivins

that

Sprouse

defaulted (Tr. 105, 118-119).

would

not

be

liable

if Jager

Edmunds testified that except for

the second to last paragraph, the NAA pretty much followed the
information he gave to Ivins, and that he did not learn of the
language in that paragraph until after Jager defaulted more than
a year later (Tr. 119) .
The NAA is only signed by Sprouse.

Sprouse (Tr. 176) and

Ivins (Tr. 216) testified that the NAA was one of the closing
documents signed on March 29, 1985, while Edraunds testified that
he did not recall seeing the NAA at closing
148-149).

(Tr. 117, 145,

The NAA bears a date of April 1, 1985.

Mr. Larsen,

the broker, testified that the NAA was delivered to his office
after the closing (Tr. 23). Ivins testified it may have been the
last document handled at the closing (Tr. 216) and that he did
not know if Edmunds had a complete set of documents at the
closing (Tr. 220). All of the other closing documents were dated
March 29, 1985 (Tr. 161 and Exhibits 3 through 14).
Sprouse

testified

that,

at

his

request,

Ivins

made

a

hand-written change in the NAA before Sprouse signed it (Tr.
202).

Ivins, an attorney (Tr. 211), testified that he did not

intend to have anyone but Sprouse sign the NAA (Tr. 225), that he
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did not have Edmunds or ICP sign the NAA because the form did not
have a place for their signature

(Tr. 233) , that he did not

remember why he did not have Edmunds initial the hand-written
change to the NAA (Tr. 234-235) , and that he did not know about
the statute of frauds (Tr. 242) .

Ivins testified that generally

only the maker of a note and the assignor of an assignment sign
those documents

(Tr. 233) , but acknowledged that the NAA also

purported to be an agreement between two parties, Sprouse and ICP
(Tr. 219) , and admitted that it should have been signed by both
parties (Tr. 234) .
If the $25,000.00 commission had been paid at closing, it
would have been distributed as follows:

ten (10%) off the top,

or $2,500.00, to Joan Templeton, as the original listing agent;
sixty (60%) percent of the $22,500.00 balance, or $13,500.00, to
Artie Edmunds as the selling agent; and forty (40%) percent of
$22,500.00, or $9,000.00, to ICP as the broker company

(Tr.

27-28, 120). However, the commission was scheduled to be paid at
$640.00 a month over 4 years

(Exhibits 15 and 20), so it was

agreed that Edmunds would acquire the entire note.

Edmunds did

this by giving up his share of other commissions due him.
Edmunds
testified

(Tr. 120-121)
that

Edmunds

and

his broker, Roy Larsen

acquired

ICP's

share

by

Both

(Tr. 30) ,
payment

of

$9,000.00 cash.
Shortly after the closing, ICP assigned the full note to
Edmunds (Trial Exhibit 16). On April 24, 1985, before the first
monthly payment was made, Edmunds assigned the note to Draper
Bank for a loan he owed to the bank (Tr. 123, Exhibit No. 18).
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After Jager defaulted, Draper Bank contacted Edmunds and
wanted something done on their loan (Tr. 129) , and assigned the
NAA back to Edmunds (Tr. 124, Exhibit No. 19).
Jager

made

13 monthly

payments

of

$3,687.50

before

he

defaulted on the June 1, 1986 payment (Tr. 50, Exhibit No. 5 ) ,
and $640.00 of each payment had been applied to the commission,
reducing the unpaid commission to $19,226.80 when Jager stopped
making payments (Exhibit No. 21) .

With interest to the day of

trial, the balance due on the commission note on July 1, 1988 was
$24,239.46 (Tr. 124-125, Exhibit No. 21).
Jager relinquished possession of the motel to Sprouse on
June

28, 1987

(Tr. 50, 51, 61), ten

commenced this action.

months

after

Sprouse

Sprouse pursued a judicial foreclosure

and on November 5, 1987, the court entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions Of Law (see Appendix "A") and a Judgment and Decree
of Foreclosure (see Appendix "B").

The judgment was originally

for $472,473.40, including $15,000.00 for Sprouse's attorney's
fees

(P. vol. II, p. 97).

Later, by the stipulation of all

parties, those fees were reduced from $15,000.00 to $3,720.50 (R.
vol.

II, 188-189),

and

an

order was

entered

in

accordance

therewith, thereby reducing the judgment to $461,193.90.
The judgment ordered the property sold at sheriff's sale,
which was held

on December

10, 1987.

Edmunds

attended the

sheriff's sale intending to bid (Tr. 134), but Sprouse made the
first bid of $360,000.00, and no higher bids were made (Tr. 135).
The property was sold to Sprouse for his bid of $360,000.00 (R.
vol. II, pp. 102-103).

The bid, by court order, reduced the
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judgment by $360,000.00, leaving a judgment of approximately
101,193.90 against Jager.
Jager1s down payment, valued at $85,000.00, consisted of one
duplex, one single family home, and a note worth $50,000.00 (Tr.
46-47, Exhibits 2 and 3).

Jager testified that in the year prior

to his default, he completely rebuilt 10 motel units at a cost of
$100,000.00, and increased business 40% (Tr. 49-50).

Sprouse did

not offer any evidence to challenge this testimony.

Sprouse had

regained

trial, and

possession

of

the

motel

a year

before

acknowledged at trial that he still had the benefits of the trade
properties and was still receiving substantial monthly payments
from them (Tr. 205-206).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Even if Sprouse is correct on the first three points raised
in his brief, he is still liable because

(1) he included the

commission in his judgment against Jager;

(2) he assigned an

undivided

$25,000.00

interest

in

the

UREC

to

secure

the

commission, and Edmunds, the holder, is entitled to share in the
proceeds from the sheriff's sale; and (3) Edmunds, as an assignee
of a partial assignment the balance of which is held by the
assignor (Sprouse), is entitled to priority in payment over the
assignor

(Sprouse) .

Thus,

even

if

the

second

to

the

last

paragraph of the NAA were enforceable, third-party plaintiffs are
still

entitled

to

be

paid

because

of

the

assignment

of a

$25,000.00 interest in the UREC.
Sprouse cannot enforce the second to the last paragraph of
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the NAAf however, because the NAA was not signed by Edmunds or
ICP, the party Sprouse wants to charge with that termf and the
statute of frauds requires such a modification of a commission
agreement to be in writing.

However, even if the statute of

frauds did not apply, the court found no note, memorandum or even
any

oral

agreement

to support

that

term, and

it never was

mutually agreed upon.
The

trial

court

heard

conflicting

testimony

regarding

whether or not Edmunds agreed to modify the written commission
agreement (set forth in the EMSA, Exhibit No. 2) so as to relieve
Sprouse of personal liability for the commission in the event
Jager defaulted.
to

assess

the

The trial judge, with his advantaged position
credibility

of

the

witnesses,

and

based

on

substantial and credible evidence, concluded that the parties did
not so agree

(Findings, M

7-9, R. vol. Ill, pp. 149-150).

Further, marshalling of the disputed trial evidence shows an
adequate basis to support the trial court's finding that the
parties did not mutually agree to modify the written commission
agreement

so

as

to

relieve

Sprouse

of

liability

if

Jager

defaulted.
The award of attorney's fees was adequately supported by the
evidence

because

Sprouse's

counsel

stipulated

to

the

reasonableness of the fee, based on 150 hours at $60.00 an hour,
for a total of
accepted

$9,000.00.

the proffer, which

attorney's

fees, without

Sprouse's

counsel

requested

an award

objection

or

and

of $9,000.00

cross-examination, and

Sprouse cannot object for the first time on appeal.

1 R

the court

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED EVEN IF POINTS I, II,
AND III OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL ARE CORRECT
BECAUSE OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF A $25,000.00 INTEREST
IN THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT.
The

NAA

(Exhibit

No.

15)

contains

$25,000.00 interest in the UREC.

an

assignraent

of

a

The first typed paragraph after

the printed material provides:
The Undersigned hereby sells, assigns and sets over to
INTERWEST COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES a $25,000.00 interest
as security for the payments set forth above in and to
that certain Uniform Real Estate Contract dated March
29, 1985 by and between Leon Sprouse, Seller, and Arjen
W. Jager, Buyer, covering the Oasis Motel, located at
231 West St. George Blvd, St. George, Utah.
Edmunds,

as

the

present

holder

of

that

instrument,

is

entitled to share in the proceeds of any foreclosure sale because
of his $25,000.00 interest in the contract.
Sprouse

has

acknowledged,

in

several ways,

that Edmunds'

rights by virtue of this partial assignment are equal to his own
rights.

First, Sprousefs answer to Edmunds counterclaim alleging

these rights essentially admitted them (R. vol. I, pp. 143-144).
Second, at trial, Sprousefs counsel proffered

the testimony of

Mrs. Sprouse to the effect that there would be an assignment to
secure the commission with "the right to stand in the shoes of
Mr.

Sprouse

and

foreclose"

(Tr. 255) .

Sprouse's brief on appeal, it states:
NAA

should

be

binding

admissions, Sprouse

in

refuses

all

Third, on page

26 of

"Sprouse argues that the

respects."

to allow Edmunds

Despite
to

share

these
in the

proceeds of the sheriff's sale, at which Sprouse bid $360,000.00.

1 fs

The trial court has also recognized Edmunds rights.

Edmunds

filed a counterclaira against Sprouse asserting his rights under
the assignment and a cross-claim against Jager asserting the
right

to

join with

126-134).

Sprouse

in

foreclosure

(R. vol. I, pp.

Edmunds claimed a $25,000.00 interest in the UREC and

rights equal to Sprouse.

Subsequently, the court entered its

Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and made a finding of fact
that Edmunds was entitled to attorney's fees of $1,500.00 in the
enforcement of his rights and the foreclosure of Jagerfs interest
under the UPEC (R. vol. II, pp. 99-99, 5 10, p. 94). The fees of
$1,500.00 awarded to Edmunds were included in the judgment of
$472,473.40 Sprouse obtained against Jager (R. vol. II, p. 97).
Later, all parties stipulated to a reduction of Sprouse's fees
(from $15,000.00 to $3,720.50), but Edmunds fees remained at
$1,500.00.

Based

on the

stipulation, the court ordered

the

judgment reduced accordingly (R. vol. II, pp. 188-191).
The

Judgment

and

Decree

of

Foreclosure

ordered the property sold at a sheriff's sale.

(Appendix

"B")

It then ordered

"that the proceeds of said sale shall be paid over to the Clerk"
to be distributed only by court order "following an adjudication
of claims" in Jager's counterclaim and "claims existing between
Plaintiff (Sprouse) and Defendant Artie Edmunds".
ICP in intervention were also covered.

The claims of

It is clear that the

court recognized Edmunds potential right to share in the proceeds
of the sheriff's sale. The adjudication of these claims was part
of the trial held July 1, 1988.
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Paragraph 14 of the Reinstated

Findings (R. vol. Ill, pp. 150-151) provides:
"14.
The Court finds that defendant [Sprouse] gave
plaintiffs [ICP] an assignment of a $25,000.00 interest
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Trial Exhibit P-3)
when defendant signed Trial Exhibit P-15 [the NAA] .
The Court further finds that plaintiffs are therefore
entitled to share in the proceeds from the sheriff's
sale of the Oasis Motel, which the Court finds was held
on December 10, 1987, at which the Oasis Motel property
was sold to defendant as the highest bidder for the bid
of $360,000.00."
The sale was noticed to be for "the highest and best bidder
for cash, lawful money of the United States."
100-101.)

(R. vol. II, pp.

Sprouse did not pay cash, nor did he deposit with the

Clerk any money

as the court had ordered.

Sprouse

apparently

felt that since most of the money was owed to him anyway, there
was no need to comply.

Sprouse f s conduct has ignored the fact

that he made a $25,000.00 assignment of the contract.
A.

Because Sprouse Included The Commission
(NAA) In His
Judgment Against Jager, He Has Acknowledged His Liability.
Sprouse has acknowledged an obligation to pay the commission

by including the $25,000.00 commission in his judgment against
Jager.

Sprouse testified at trial that he wanted $450,000.00 for

the Oasis Motel and that any commission would have to be added to
that amount.

He testified

$475,000.00 offer

that before he agreed

to sign the

(Exhibit No. 2 ) , he insisted on changing the

six (6%) percent commission (which would have been $28,500.00) to
a $25,000.00 commission, so that he would receive $450,000.00 for
the property.
commission.

The price of $475,000.00 therefore includes the

The $85,000.00 agreed equity in the three properties

Sprouse received from Jager at closing reduced the contract from

1 O

$475,000.00

to

$390,000.00.

Since

Sprouse

received

those

properties (and still has them), the commission was included in
the unpaid balance of $390,000.00, for which Jager signed notes
and made payments until he defaulted.
The

judgment

Sprouse

obtained

against

Jager

was

for

$472,473.40, and included $386,275.13 as the principal balance
owed on the $390,000.00 notes.
Foreclosure

includes

the

Thus, the Judgment and Decree of

full balance

owed

by Jager on the

contract, and thereby includes the very commission which Sprouse
is now attempting to avoid.

Further, Sprouse included in his

judgment $59,542.42 accrued interest on the $386,275.13.

That

means his judgment even includes interest on the commission.
Sprouse accuses Edmunds, on page 24 of his brief, of wanting
to have his cake and eat it too.

However, it is Sprouse who (A)

took Jager1 s $85,000.00 worth of traded properties (and is still
receiving

substantial

payments

on

them);

(B)

took

Jager's

payments until he defaulted; (C) took the motel back along with
$100,000.00 worth of undisputed

improvements; and

(D) took a

judgment against Jager that included the $25,000.00 interest that
he had assigned

for the commission.

Even after giving Jager

credit for the $360,000.00 he bid at the sheriff's sale, Sprouse
still has a judgment of over $100,000.00 against Jager which he
can collect.

That judgment even includes $1,500.00 of Edmunds'

attorney's fees, yet Sprouse has refused to allow Edmunds to
share in the proceeds from the sheriff's sale.

Sprouse cannot be

allowed to obtain a judgment including the commission without
having to account for it to his assignee.
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B.

Edmunds, As The Holder Of The NAA, Is Entitled To Share In
The Proceeds From The Sheriff's Sale, Because Assigned
Rights Under A Real Estate Contract Are Treated Like A
Mortgage.
The Uniform Real Estate Contract Sprouse and Jager signed is

freely assignable
assignee

takes

assignment

(3 18, Exhibit No. 3 ) .
the

transfers

property to another.

same
the

rights

his

interest

of

By an assignment, the

assignor
one

had,

party

in

and

an

certain

Tanner v. Lawler 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P. 2d

882 (1957); Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co. 608 P. 2d 236 (Utah 1980).
In

Butler

1255-56,

the

v.

Wilkinson

court

740

recognized

P.

2d

that

1244
the

(Utah
vendor

1987) , at
under

an

installment land contract has an interest that he can sell or
mortgage that is measured by the amount the vendee owes under the
contract, which is given the same special priority as purchase
money

mortgages

essential
reasonable

for
way

in

an

order

to

installment

of

selling

provide

the

contract

to

real

estate.

critical
be

a

security

commercially

Sprouse

sold,

or

mortgaged, $25,000.00 of his interest in the UREC with Jager, and
Edmunds, as the holder, is entitled to the same protection the
law affords Sprouse.
A

partial

fraction, " . . .

assignment,

whether

stated

as

an

amount

or

is operative as to that part to the same extent

and in the same manner as if the part had been a separate right."
Restatement, Contracts 2d § 326 (1) .
to the motel under the UREC

Since Sprouse retained title

for security, he is treated as a

constructive trustee of the collateral for the assignee (Edmunds)

?0

when he has made such an assignment and holds the collateral
(see, Restatement, Contracts 2d, § 340(2)).
In Utah Farm Production Credit v. Wasatch Bank 734 P. 2d 904
(Utah 1987) the court said that:
" . . . when a borrower assigns an interest in a real
estate
contract
as
security
for a loan, the
assignee-lender acquires a lien on the borrower's
interest in the real property which is treated like a
mortgage."
Sprouse assigned the $25,000.00 interest in the UREC as
security for the commission he owed.

Edmunds, the present holder

and assignee, acquired a lien on Sprouse's interest in the motel
that is treated like a mortgage.
In Campbell v. Warren 726 P. 2d 623 (Ariz. App. 1986) the
court quoted from Batesville Institute v. Kauffman 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 151, 153, 21 L.Ed. 775, 776 (1873), as follows:
fl

[N]o principle is better settled than this, that the
assignment of a debt carries with it an assignment of a
judgment or mortgage by which it is secured. If a part
only of the debt is assigned, a pro tanto portion of
the security follows it."
At the very least, Edmunds is entitled to a pro rata share
of

the

proceeds

$20,091.78.

This

from
is

the

sheriff's

calculated

by

sale,

dividing

which
the

would

be

$360,000.00

proceeds by $461,193.90 (the total judgment as raodified by the
stipulated
resulting

reduction of Sprouse's
fraction by

$25,739.46

fees), and multiplying the
(the sum of

the $24,239.46

commission and the $1,500.00 of Edmund's fees which were both
included in Sprouse's judgment).

Since Sprouse has refused to

recognize Edmunds assignment rights and has forced Edmunds to
assert his legal rights under the NAA (under both the note and

the assignment set forth in the NAA), Edmunds is also entitled to
his attorney's fees in this action against Sprouse as provided in
the NAA.

Further, Edmunds is entitled

amounts because they were included

to interest on these

in Sprousefs

judgment and

because Sprouse has refused to allow Edmunds to share in the
sales proceeds or to pay the proceeds into court.
C.

Edmunds Assigned Rights In The UREC Are Entitled To Priority
In Payment Because The Portion Assigned Has Priority Over
The Portion Retained And Because Of The Intent To Pay The
Commission First.
The $360,000.00 from the sheriff's sale must be applied in

satisfaction

of

the

judgment.

The

issue

is how

should

the

$360,000.00 received at the sale be applied to the $25,000.00
interest

assigned

and

the

$365,000.00

($390,000.00

$25,000.00) interest retained by Sprouse?
Sprouse's interest first?

minus

Should it all go to

To Edmund's interest first?

To both

interests in proportionate or pro rata amounts?
Since assignments of rights under land contracts are treated
like

mortgages

(Utah

Farm,

supra), we

look

to

the

law of

mortgages to determine priority.

An assignment of a mortgage or

contract

assignment

debt

operates

as

an

of

the

underlying

mortgage or contract itself, and this rule extends to a partial
assignment, which carries with it a proportional interest in the
contract and vests the assignee with the powers and rights of the
mortgagee as fully as if he had been made such in the original
contract (55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages, §§1284 and 1301) .
The question of priority of partial assignments which are
secured by the same contract that secures the interest retained

by the assignor are said to involve ". . . a n inquiry as to an
iraplied agreement, and, if none, a consideration of the existence
of

arising

out of the

assignment." (§ 1321 of 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages).

Here, there

is

an equity

such

in

favor of

the

assignee

an equity, as the proof

commission

amortizes

first,

in

shows

four

that the

years, while

$25,000.00
Sprouse's

retained interest amortizes in 25 years (Trial Exhibit No. 20) .
It is also clear that the parties intended that the commission
should be fully paid by the time the amount owed by Jager was
reduced to $375,000.00 (Trial Exhibit No. 22). It is clear that
the commission was to be retired and paid first.
The rule on this issue is found at 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages
§ 1325, where it states:
11

. . . that where several notes are secured by one
mortgage and some of them are assigned, the assignees
take precedence over the assignor with respect to the
notes retained by the assignor. . . . Even in the
courts that apply the prorata rule, there is some
conflict as to its application between an assignor and
assignee. By some, the equity arising out of the fact
that the holder of some notes is the assignee of the
holder of others is held to be strong enough to take
the case out of the general rule, and the assignee is
considered as entitled to a preference over the
assignor."
The reason for the rule was explained in Lawson v. Warren 34
Okl. 94, 124 P. 2d 46 (1912), referring to Jones on Mortgages
(6th Ed.) § 1701, as follows:
"Whers a holder of a mortgage assigns a part of it,
although he warrants only the existence of the debt at
the time of the transfer, it would be contrary to good
faith to permit him, after receiving the money for this
part of the claim, to come into competition with his
assignee, if the property prove insufficient to pay the
claims of both.
Unless the intention be plainly
declared on the face of the assignment that the
assignee is to share pro rata in the security with the
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assignor, the equitable construction of it is that it
must in the first place be applied for the payment of
the part of the debt which was assigned."
The court then gave the following example:
"The reason the assignee is to be preferred is founded
on the plainest principle of equity. When two notes
are assigned to different persons, they are both
presumed to have paid value, and they must share
equally in the proceeds of the mortgaged property in
order to preserve the equality which is equity. But to
apply the same rule between the mortgagee and a person
to whom he had transferred one of the notes would lead
to inequality.
For illustration, say that the
mortgagee holds two notes for $1,000 each. He assigns
one of them for value. The property securing their
payment only brings $1,000, or enough to pay one note.
If the mortgagee shares in the proceeds he will get out
of the debt $1,500, the $1,000 he received for the
first note and the $500 he receives from the proceeds
of the mortgaged property, while the assignee for half
the debt only receives $500. The mortgagee would thus
receive more than if he had kept both notes. This is
not right."
Sprouse received full value for the $25,000.00 assignment,
because he was obligated to pay a $25,000.00 commission at the
closing (Exhibit No. 2, bottom of page 2).

Limiting Edmunds to a

pro rata portion allows Sprouse to receive more than full value
for the assignment because the $25,000.00 commission debt is
extinguished

plus

he

recovers

a percentage

assigned to pay the commission.

of

what

he had

Therefore, Edmunds should be

given priority and should be paid in full from the proceeds of
the sheriff1s sale and the balance belongs to Sprouse.

Not only

was it the intent to pay the commission first (in 4 years, while
the UREC ran for 25 years) , but the partial assignment is, by
law, entitled to priority.
Nor can Sprouse argue that his bid was a so-called "credit
bid" and that he is not obligated to actually pay the amount he

OA

bid.

While that theory may be appropriate when there are no

other interested parties, in this case there was a court order
that the amount bid be paid into the Clerk of the Court because
of existing and unadjudicated claims, Edmunds1 being one of them.
Sprouse violated the court order by not paying to the Clerk the
$360,000.00 he bid, and
69(e)(4),

URCP.

Utah

is in contempt of court under Rule
mortgage

foreclosure

law

makes

no

exceptions for sellers who bid, and Rule 69 must be strictly
followed.
D.

Even If The Paragraph Of The NAA Purporting To Relieve
Sprouse Of Personal Liability Is Valid, Edmunds Must Be Paid
In Full From The $360,000.00 Proceeds From The Sheriff's
Sale.
Sprousefs entire appeal rests on one paragraph of the NAA,

the second to last paragraph, which says:
"The parties hereto understand and agree that this
instrument does not obligate the undersigned to
personally pay the amounts set forth herein. The
obligation for payment hereunder arises only out of the
payments received by Heritage under the Unifrom (sic)
Real Estate Contract referred to above."
(Emphasis
Added.)
Although the NAA was not signed by Edmunds, ICP or anyone
else but Sprouse, he claims that Edmunds agreed to this at the
time Sprouse signed the offer (Exhibit No. 2) at his home in Las
Vegas.

Although Sprouse admits that he insisted on changing the

six (6%) percent commission to $25,000.00 at that time, he claims
that there wasn't room to make the change.

However, all that

needed to be added was that the commission was only payable from
Jager's payments, and Sprouse was not personally liable.
was room for that much.
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There

But even if we assume that Sprouse's claims are correct,
Edmunds is still entitled to full payment from the sheriff's sale
proceeds because those proceeds are received by Heritage, or were
agreed to be received through Heritage, and they must be treated
as such.
Sprouse

and Jager

agreed, in paragraph

17 of the UREC

(Exhibit No. 3) upon Heritage serving as the escrow agent and as
trustee (see also Exhibit No. 6, the Escrow Agreement).

Sprouse,

in his second amended complaint, elected the remedy of paragraph
16C of the UREC (R. vol. I, pp. 93-103).

This remedy provides

that Heritage, as trustee, is to proceed with the foreclosure.
Thus, any proceeds from the foreclosure must necessarily pass
through Heritage, as Sprouse and Jager so agreed.
The parties are bound to strictly follow the foreclosure
procedure set out in the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

As stated

in 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages, § 695, page 636:
"A sale made under the authority of a power of sale in
a mortgage or deed of trust must be in strict
compliance with that power. The power is limited and
defined by the instrument in which it is contained . .
. . neither the trustee nor the court should disregard
the terms of the power. Accordingly, the trustee or
mortgagee must see that in all material matters he
keeps within his powers, and must execute the trust in
strict compliance therewith. . . . The power to sell
is a matter of contract and the parties are bound to a
strict observance of its terms."
The Utah Supreme Court has recently followed this rule in
Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services 6 4 Utah Adv.
Rep. 20 (09/01/87), when the court said:
"The maker of the deed of trust with power of sale may
condition the exercise of the power upon such
conditions as he may describe.

OC

The grantor of the power is entitled to have his
directions obeyed; to have the proper notice of sale
given; to have it take place at the time and place, and
by the person appointed by hinu
(Citations Omitted)•
The right of a grantor of a deed of trust to have its
provisions strictly complied with to effect a valid
foreclosure sale is absolute." (Emphasis Added.)
In this case, the parties have, by their contract, agreed
that the escrow agent, Heritage, is to handle any foreclosure.
It therefore follows that any amount bid at the sheriff's sale
would be received by Heritage and therefore available for payment
of the commission, no matter what interpretation the NAA is
given.
POINT II
THE NAA IS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THE BROKER
IS THE PARTY TO BE CHARGED WHEN THE LANDOWNER ALLEGES
A MODIFICATION AGREEMENT THAT ELIMINATES A COMMISSION.
NONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE CLAIMED BY SPROUSE
APPLY UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Sprouse argues that the paragraph of the N£A, which purports
to relieve him of liability if Jager defaults, is not within the
statute of frauds, or even if it is, that the broker is not the
"party to be charged", and need not sign it for it to be binding
upon him.

Even if Sprouse is right on both these points, he then

must show that there actually was an agreement, or mutual assent,
to that paragraph.

Knowing this, Sprouse also contends in his

brief that the trial court erred in finding that there was no
such agreement.

That issue will be addressed next, although it

need not be reached because the statute of frauds does apply to
that paragraph of the NAA.
A further problem, not addressed in Sprouse1s brief, is that
Sprouse only alleges that Edmunds, the real estate sales agent,
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orally agreed to that paragraph.

Sprouse makes no claim that the

broker agreed to the same paragraph.

General business havoc

would result if brokers were suddenly confronted with determining
the validity of various oral promises or agreements allegedly
made by their selling agents.
Another

obvious

answered is this:

question

Sprouse

has

not

addressed

or

What was the point of giving the broker a

$25,000.00 assignment of the contract, if it was true that if
Jager defaulted, no further payments were required?

Obviously,

there is absolutely no point in making such as assignment if that
was the understanding.

If Jager defaults, the ball game is over,

and the assignment for security is completely useless.
The Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-4(5) of the Utah Code,
provides that:
"In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith:
. . . .

(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation." (Emphasis Added).
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement (Exhibit No. 2) contains a
sufficient writing signed by Sprouse (bottom of page 2) , who is
the party to be charged under it (since it is his obligation to
pay

the

frauds.

commission)

and

therefore

satisfies

the

statute

of

It establishes Sprousefs obligation to pay, and the

broker's right to receive, the $25,000.00 commission.
Sprouse claims that his obligation to pay the commission was
modified by the NAA, which was signed by him but not by the
broker or by Edmunds.

Several Utah cases have held that if an

original agreement is within the statute of frauds (such as a
coramission agreement) , a subsequent agreement which modifies the
original written agreement must also satisfy the requirements of
the statute of frauds to be enforceable.

Coombs v. Ouzounian 24

Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356; Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions
88 Utah 194, 48 P.2d 489; Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian 71
Utah 535, 267 P. 1020.
In Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt

(Utah 1975) 538 P.2d

1319, the Court said:
"It is elementary that when a contract is required to
be in writing, the same requirement applies with equal
force to any alteration or modification thereof."
The rule appears well settled in Utah.

Since Sprouse is

attempting to hold the broker and Edmunds to the NAA, it must be
signed by them as the "party to be charged".

It is not.

Sprouse

cannot unilaterally alter or modify the agreement by signing
documents which have not been signed by the broker or Edmunds.
Sprouse contends that only the landowner is a party to be
charged, and that the statute of frauds does not require the
broker to sign a commission agreement or an agreement modifying a
commission agreement.

It that were the case, the statute should

simply say "landowner" instead of "party to be charged".
clear

that

the

"party

to

be

charged"

under

the

It is

original

coraraission agreement (Exhibit No. 2) is Sprouse, since he has the
obligation to pay $25,000.00. But the broker is the "party to be
charged" under any alleged agreeraent, like the second to last
paragraph in the NAA, that would reduce or eliminate altogether

the obligation

to pay.

That

is why

it is

important

for the

"party to be charged" to manifest his assent by a signed writing.
Sprouse

claim

that

direction is wrong.
which

say Section

the

statute

operates

in

only

one

Although Sprouse correctly refers to cases
25-5-4(5)

is intended

to protect

landowners

against fraudulent claims for commissions, that is not the only
reason for the statute.
2d 1114

In Ney v. Harrison 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.

(1956) , the court

found

two policies

implicit

in the

statute:
"The protection of the landowner from the imposition of
spurious claims by real estate brokers, or the
necessity of protecting the broker, who has rendered a
bona fide service, from being refused just compensation
for his work by the landowner."
According

to

the

comment

to

Section

135

of

Restatement,

Contracts 2d, the words "party to be charged" refer to the party
to be charged in the legal proceeding.
party

to

be

charged

is

the

party

Other authorities say the
against

whom

contract or memorandum is sought to be enforced
Statute of Frauds § 364; 94 ALR2d 921).

the

alleged

(72 Am. Jur. 2d

The statute operates,

then, as needed, to protect both the landowner and the broker.
In

this

case,

agreement

that

it

protects

would

wash

the

broker

away

his

from

an

alleged

compensation

oral

if

Jager

Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis 646 P.2d 741

(Utah,

defaulted.

1982)

is

a

subparagraph

case

dealing

with

exactly

the

same

issue

under

(2), instead of (5), of the same statute of frauds.

It was an action against Francis, a guarantor, for amounts due on
a written

personal

guarantee.

On

appeal, a

summary

judgment

against Francis was affirmed against his contention that whether
or not plaintiff had orally released him from liability on the
guarantee was a genuine issue of material fact.
that

even

if

an

oral

release

were

proved,

The Court held
it

would

be

unenforceable as a matter of law under the statute of frauds.
The Court noted that the personal guarantee was in writing, as
required by §25-5-4(2) of the Utah Code, and was signed by
Francis, the party to be charged by it. The Court then said:
"By the same token, the release or revocation of an
agreement to answer for the debt of another must also
be in writing. It is well settled that if an original
agreement is within the Statute of Frauds, any
subsequent agreement which alters or amends it must
also
satisfy
the
requirements
of the Statute.
(Citations
omitted.)
The
alleged
oral
release
obviously
does not meet
those
requirements of
enforceability."
The oral release must be signed by the plaintiff as the
party to be charged with it.

The same applies here—Sprouse must

sign the original commission agreement, as he is charged with it
(just as Francis was charged with the guarantee), and the broker
must sign an agreement releasing the commission

(just as the

plaintiff above would have to sign such a release to be charged
with it).

In SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber 732 P. 2d 105 (Utah

1986) it was said that an agreement to terminate or rescind a
contract, such as the commission contract in issue here, must be
done by a written contract if the contract that is extinguished
falls within the Statute of Frauds. The NAA, not being signed by
the broker, is not sufficient.
Sprouse!s brief says that brokers owed a commission do not
acquire an interest in land that merits the statute's protection.

This is a curious statement, because even a cursory reading of
Section 25-5-4 shows that it has 6 subsections, none of which
necessarily have anything to do with an interest in land, and all
of which are subject to the "party to be charged" language.
Sprouse is confusing Section 25-5-4 with 25-5-1.
Sprouse has failed to present any relevant authority for his
claim

that

terms

of

the

NAA

which

purport

to

modify

the

coraraission agreement do not have to be in writing signed by the
broker as the party to be charged.

There is no such authority,

and the law is to the contrary.
In 12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers, § 52, page 811, the general rule
is stated as follows:
"If the original contract employing a broker is
required to be in writing, any modification thereof
which results in a new contract must itself be in
writing to be effective to confer on the agent the
right to compensation in accordance with the modified
contract."
Also, in 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 274, page 789,

"The broad general doctrine as announced by most
authorities is that a contract required by the statute
of frauds to be in writing cannot be validly changed or
modified as to any material condition therein by
subsequent oral agreement so as to make the original
written agreement as modified by the oral one an
enforceable obligation. To state the rule differently,
where an original agreement comes within provisions of
the statute of frauds requiring certain agreements to
be in writing, the statute of frauds renders invalid
and ineffectual a subsequent oral agreement changing
the terras of the written contract."
Utah follows this general rule.

In Golden Key Realty, Inc.

v. Mantas 699 P.2d 730 (Utah, 1985), a case where a broker sued

for his commission, the Court said:
"The rule
agreement
agreement
must also
frauds to

is well settled in Utah that if an original
is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent
which modifies the original written agreement
satisfy the requirements of the statute of
be enforceable."

Sprouse cites this case as similar because the statute of
frauds was

avoided

satisfaction,

a

in Golden Key

different

question

by

finding

than

an accord

modification

and

of

a

commission agreement.

If Sprouse is attempting to assert that

the NAA accomplished

an accord and satisfaction, it must be

pointed

out

that

accord

and

satisfaction

is

an

defense that must be pleaded or it is waived.
Huntington

Cleveland

Irr. Co.

664

P.

2d

1188

affirmative

See Staker v.
(Utah

1983).

Sprouse has failed to plead accord and satisfaction or raise it
as a defense at any time prior to his brief.
Sprouse's claim that the NAA is not within the statute of
frauds because it altered only terms of commission payment and
not terms of employment is without merit.

Price and terms are

frequently the most important term in contracts.
the

parties

made

the

terms

of

commission

material, since Exhibit No. 2 provides

In this case,

payment

expressly

(in the section on the

commission) that the terms cannot be changed without the broker's
consent.

It is difficult to conceive, at least from the broker's

viewpoint, of any term more material to a commission agreement
than the amount of the commission and the time of its payment.
Mr. Sprousefs attorney is misleading the court when he
quotes C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey 758 P.2d 923 (Utah App. 1988)
as standing for the proposition that only the matter or fact of

eraployraent is within the statute of frauds, but that the terras of
the coraraission, such as amount, time of payment etc. are not
within the statute of frauds. Counsel fails to continue with the
quoted material, which makes it clear that all the terras of the
eraployraent have to be made definite under the statute of frauds.
The

Utah

court

is quoting

the California

case dealing with

whether or not the legal description of the land needs to be
described specifically, which full quote, provides:
"the essential part of a contract to employ a real
estate broker, so far as the statute of frauds is
concerned, is the matter of the employment and
consequently need not describe the land specifically,
if the terras of the employment can be made definite
without it." [i.e., without describing the land, an
entirely different issue than the issue here].
Terms of employment include the amount of the commission to
be paid, the date of its payment etc.
relevant

authority

for

his

Sprouse fails to cite any

argument

that

the

terras

of

compensation are nothing more than a security agreement, are not
raaterial parts of the contract, and are not within the statute of
frauds.

On the contrary, these kind of terms have been held

material and within the statute of frauds.

Foster v. Mutual

Savings

According

Asso.

602

SW2d

98

(Texas

1980) .

to Mr.

Sprousefs position, only the fact of employment is required to
comply with the statute of frauds and therefore be in writing
signed by the party to be charged.
the

intent

and

purpose of

the

This theory would eviscerate
statute of

frauds, which

is

designed to protect both the landowner and the broker against
fraudulent or fictitious claims.

Nothing would stop an agent or

broker, once the fact of eraployraent is established, to maintain

^

A

that the owner agreed to a 20%, or 30% or even 50% coraraission.
Likewise, nothing would stop the landowner from asserting, if the
fact of employment is established, that the agent or broker
agreed to accept 5%, 3% or even forgo the commission.
Sprouse also contends that because the NAA was assigned to
Edmunds, then to Draper Bank, and then back to Edmunds, that
these subsequent assignments are a sufficient writing to satisfy
the statute.

However, these subsequent assignments dealt with

only the note portion of the NAA and made no specific reference
to the agreement portion which purports, under only Mr. Sprouse's
signature, to constitute an agreement that no further commissions
would be payable if Jager defaults. These assignraents do not
relate

to the

transaction

between

Sprouse

& Jager, or even

between Sprouse and ICP, but relate to subsequent transactions in
which the right to receive the commission was passed on to other
parties.
The unrebutted evidence presented at trial showed that the
assignment from ICP to Edmunds was made for full value, dollar
for dollar, with Edmunds giving ICP cash of $9,000.00 for its
interest in the contract, and that it was done without knowledge
of the language in the NAA's second to last paragraph.

This is

an obvious indication that the parties did not agree to the NAA
term

relieving

Sprouse

of

liability

if Jager

defaulted, as

Edmunds would certainly not be foolish enough to pay $9,000.00
for a note that could evaporate into nothing if Jager defaulted,
a situation far beyond his control.
Draper

Bank

sent

the note back

TR

When Jager did default,

to Edmunds, contending

that

Edmunds was still fully liable to Draper Bank.
shows that Draper Bank

had not agreed

This conduct

to the NAA paragraph

limiting Sprouse1s liability when it received the assignment (see
Trial Exhibit No. 19).
There must also be something in the subsequent assignments
that clearly show that Edmunds agreed to and accepted the term of
the

NAA

that

says

Sprouse

is

not

personally

liable.

distinguishes this case from those cited by Sprouse.

This

There is

simply nothing in any of the subsequent assignments that even
suggests a connection, let alone an agreement, to that term.

The

subsequent assignments, rather than showing an agreement to the
disputed term of the NAA, are actually evidence that the term was
never agreed upon, otherwise, it is highly doubtful that anyone
would be willing to accept or pay value for such an assignment.
In order to satisfy the statute of frauds, the additional
writings a party asserts must contain all the essential terms and
provisions of the contract to which the parties have agreed, and
must set out the conditions of the transaction with adequate
certainty,

which

requirement

is

not

met

if

the

additional

writings lack any acknowledgement or recognition that the parties
have entered into the alleged agreement.

See Machan Hampshire

Properties v. Western Real Estate & Dev. 779 P. 2d 230 (Utah
1989).
Sprouse claims that because of the subsequent assignments
and because 13 payments were received on the note, that Edmunds
has manifested his consent to the NAA.

That may be true for the

"note" and "assignment" portions of the NAA, because all the

7£

parties testified that it was agreed that Sprouse would sign a
note with interest and secure it by an assignment of the UREC,
but it is certainly not true of the "agreement" portion of the
NAA, to which neither he nor his broker consented.
Sprouse has only indirectly mentioned the issue of part
performance on appeal, so suffice it to say that this issue was
fully briefed for the trial court (see R. vol. II, pp. 267-271).
The acceptance by Draper Bank of 13 payments does not constitute
part performance and take the NAA out of the statute of frauds
because the payments are not "exclusively

referable" to that

alleged term, but are consistent with the "note" portion of the
NAA, which is not disputed.

See, for example, Downtown Athletic

Club v. Horman 740 P. 2d 275 (Utah 1987).
The

issues

in this case are very

similar

to those

in

Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson 672 P. 2d 746 (Utah, 1983)
because there was not enough cash available at the closing to
meet the needs of the parties.

The broker, who was entitled to a

$51,000.00 commission, took only $15,000.00 of it at the closing
and the seller signed a note for the balance of $36,000.00. When
the

buyer

filed

for bankruptcy

and

failed

to make

further

payments, the seller refused to pay the note, claiming, exactly
as Sprouse has done here, that (1) payment of the balance of the
commission was conditioned upon the buyer's payments; (2) that
the escrow agreement, which provided

for distribution of the

commission from the buyer's payments, showed an agreement that
the broker would not look beyond payments coming through the
escrow agreement for payment of the commission; and (3) since the
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buyer defaulted, the broker had not produced a buyer who was
ready, willing and able, a condition to payment on the note. All
three of these defenses failed.

The district court granted the

broker's motion for summary judgment.
was affirmed.

On appeal, the judgment

The court said:

"Absent a contractual provision, which conditions the
right to a commission on the performance of the buyer,
the general rule accepted in Utah is that a broker has
earned his commission upon the procuring of a buyer who
is ready, willing and able and who is accepted by the
seller. The broker is not an insurer of the subsequent
performance of the contract and is not deprived of his
right to a commission by the failure or refusal of the
buyer to perform."
The

court

rejected

the

seller's

claim

that

the

escrow

agreement, because it specifically provided for payment of the
commission out of payments made by the buyer, constituted an
agreement by the broker not to look beyond the escrow payments:
"Furthermore, the defendants' contention that the
plaintiff look only to the buyer's payments into escrow
for its commission would render the note meaningless
and ignore the undisputed benefit received by the
defendants from the plaintiff's agreement to defer part
of the commission due at closing. On its face, the
escrow agreement merely provides for a method of
distribution of the payments made by the buyer."
The
obligated

same
to

reasoning
pay

the

applies

commission

in

this

at

case.

closing.

Sprouse
To

hold

was
that

third-party plaintiffs must look only to Jager's payments for the
commission would

render

the note and

assignment portions of

Exhibit No. 15, the NAA, meaningless and ignores the undisputed
benefit Sprouse received from the broker's willingness to defer
the payment of the commission over a four year period.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS THE TRI£L COURT'S FINDING
THAT THERE WAS NO MUTUAL CONSENT TO THE DISPUTED TERM OF
THE NAA. THEREFORE, THE COURT'S ENFORCEMENT OF THE NOTE
AND ASSIGNMENT PORTIONS OF THE NAA WAS APPROPRIATE.
If a contract's interpretation is determined by extrinsic
evidence of intent, then it is a question of fact.
Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647

Seashores

(Utah Ct. App. 1987).

It

follows that if a contract's very existence is determined by
extrinsic evidence, it is also a question of

fact.

When a

contract is ambiguous and the court finds facts regarding the
parties' intent based on extrinsic evidence, the court's review
is

strictly

limited.

Copper

State

Leasing

Co. v>

Blackner

Appliance & Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1988).

In these

circumstances, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed
or set aside on appeal unless they are "clearly erroneous", or
against the clear weight of the evidence and the appellate court
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

When the

evidence is controverted, the appellate court assumes that the
trial

judge believed

those

aspects of

the evidence

and the

inferences reasonably drawn from them that support his decision.
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296,
1302 (Utah 1987) .
Sprouse's duty on appeal is to marshall all the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings, and then demonstrate that
the court's findings are clearly erroneous.

Sprouse has failed

to marshall the evidence supporting the court's findings, but
even a brief review shows that the court's findings are amply

supported.
Sprouse claims that Edmunds agreed that he would not be
personally liable for the commission at the time he signed the
EMSA.

Evidence showed that Sprouse is a seasoned and experienced

businessman with
motels

several

(Tr. 165, 196).

business
He

interests, including

admitted

that

he

knew

other

such

an

agreement should have been in writing, but weakly claims there
"wasn't room" on the EMSA (Tr. 178, 193). However, he found room
to

have

the

commission

$25,000.00, and

reduced

from

six

(6%)

percent

this change was made at his insistence

to
(Tr.

91-93, 193, 196). The fact is there was plenty of room, either
in the commission section itself, or by an attached addendum, of
which there were already two pages
would be no trouble.

(Exhibit No. 2) .

A third

In the commission section itself, the last

part of the last line could have been blacked out after the word
"payable" and words added to reflect such an agreement.
example, it could

easily

have been

changed

to read:

For
"Said

commission shall be payable only from Jager's monthly payments
and

Sprouse

is

not

personally

liable

for

any

part

of

the

commission."
Edmunds

testified

there was

no

such

agreement

or

even

discussion (Tr. 105, 118, 148), and that his broker was adamantly
opposed to anything like that and would never allow him to enter
into

such an agreement

(Tr. 118) .

Roy

Larsen, the broker,

testified he had not agreed to such an arrangement, and never
would authorize such an arrangement (Tr. 26-27) .
and

Roy

Larsen both

testified

that, in all

A

n

Claudia Ashby

their years of

experience, they had never encountered

a situation where the

seller's liability for the commission was excused if the buyer
defaulted, although they both estimated that commission deferral
occurs in about 10% of the closings (Tr. 19-20, 36, 42-43).
James Ivins simply made a mistake.

Although he testified

his recollection was that Edmunds had told him what he put in the
second to last paragraph of Exhibit No. 15 (Tr. 241), he admitted
that some parts of Exhibit No. 15 were his own creation, such as
the assignment language (Tr. 2 29) , and he acknowledged that he
was

getting

information

on

this

transaction

different people and places (Tr. 240) .

from

lots

of

The notes he had could

have been from telephone conversations he had with Jager or
Sprouse, as he admitted to having such calls (Tr. 211, 223).
The key evidence on determining whether the parties ever
agreed to the second to last paragraph of the NAA is Exhibit No.
24, the handwritten note Ivins testified he received from Edmunds
after the telephone call in which he thought Edmunds told him
there would be no personal liability (Tr. 220, 237). Exhibit No.
24 supports every paragraph of the NAA except the critical second
to last paragraph, thereby showing, by what is not said, that
there was no agreement that Sprouse would not be personally
liable.

Ivins testified this was a source document for preparing

the NAA (Tr. 221) . Very conspicuous by its absence in Exhibit 24
is any mention or reference to the commission not being payable
if Jager defaults.

Thus, this term was added either at the sole

instance of Sprouse or simply by Ivins, who admitted that parts
of the NAA were of his own creation.

In either case, however,

such added terms are not binding on third-party plaintiffs, who
did not sign or assent to the added terms at any time.
Proof that there was no such oral agreement is demonstrated
by Edmunds subsequent conduct in giving up his $9,000.00 share of
the commission on the Wyoming closing to obtain ICP's $9,000.00
interest in the Sprouse-Jager commission

(Tr. 29-30, 120-121).

Although Edmunds was inexperienced, only a complete fool would
give up $9,000 in cash to acquire a $9,000 interest in a note
that could be wiped out if Jager defaulted.

This is the clearest

sort of contemporary evidence that Edmunds did not agree to such
a term.
The Court heard evidence
regarding this NAA.
testified.

from all the principal players

The preparer of the document, Mr. Ivins,

The signer of the document, Mr. Sprouse, testified.

The payees of the document, Roy Larsen (for Interwest Commercial
Properties) and Mr. Edmunds testified.

The Court allowed parol

evidence concerning that document because it was ambiguous.

It

was ambiguous because it gives an assignment for security in one
paragraph, but then purports to make that assignment meaningless
in another paragraph which says that if Jager defaults, Sprouse
is not personally

liable.

The Court accepted all this parol

evidence in order to find the true intention of the parties, and
found that there had been no meeting of the minds, or mutual
assent, to the one term of the NAA that allegedly excuses Sprouse
from liability if Jager defaults.
The court appropriately found the agreement of the parties
and enforced it.

The "note" and "assignment" portions of the NAA
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are enforceable against Sprouse because he signed it.

Besides,

those portions of the NAA were in fact agreed to by Edmunds and
ICP (see Exhibit No. 24). But those portions of the NAA would be
enforceable against Sprouse even if Edmunds and ICP didn't agree,
because Sprouse's signature is the only signature required on a
note or an assignment.
The

"agreement"

portion

of

the NAA, however, being

an

agreement, requires that both parties to the agreement manifest
their consent by signature.

Since neither Edmunds nor ICP signed

it, the court received extrinsic evidence to determine whether or
not they ever orally agreed to its terms.

The court found that

the parties never agreed to the disputed term, and that it never
became part of their agreement.

Sprouse contends that the NAA is

an "entire" contract and not "several", but it does not matter,
since Sprouse is incorrectly assuming that the disputed second to
last paragraph became part of the agreement, but it never did.
In fact, the second to last paragraph of the NAA is contrary
to and repugnant with the "assignment" paragraph two paragraphs
above

it

in

the

same

NAA.

The

first

paragraph

gives

an

assignraent of the UREC to secure the note, while the second
purports to be an agreement that Sprouse alleges relieves him of
liability if Jager defaults, even of liability to account to the
assignee for the proceeds from the sheriff's sale.

If the second

is valid, it eviscerates the first, and if the first is valid, it
contradicts the second.

When there is a repugnancy between two

clauses, it is the province and duty of the court to reconcile
them

if possible, but

if not, a subsequent

4?

clause

that is

irreconcilable with a former clause and repugnant to the general
purpose and intent may be disregarded.

Mifflin v. Shiki 77 Utah

190, 293 P. 1.
Thus, it was proper for the court to enforce the undisputed
"note" and "assignment" portions of the NAA, and to disregard the
second to last paragraph, or "agreement" part, since it was never
signed and there never was any mutual assent to it.
POINT IV
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE. IN ANY EVENT, SPROUSE STIPULATED TO
THE REASONABLENESS OF THE FEES. NOT HAVING
CHALLENGED THE FEES AT TRIAL, SPROUSE CANNOT
DO SO FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. RESPONDENTS
ARE ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL FEES ON APPEAL.
There
award

of

Findings,

should
his
R.

be no issue that Edmunds

attorney's
vol.

fees.

Ill, pp.

The

150, M

court
12-13)

is entitled
found
that

to an

(Reinstated
an

award

of

attorney's fees to Edmunds was supported by (1) the Earnest Money
Sales Agreement

(Exhibit No. 2, see paragraph B, page 3; R. vol.

II, p. 88); and

(2) the attorney's fee provision of the "note"

portion of the NAA

(Exhibit No. 15) .

It might also be pointed

out that Edmunds, as the holder of a $25,000.00 interest in the
UREC, is entitled to attorney's fees under paragraph 14 of the
UREC (Exhibit No. 3) for enforcement of his rights thereunder.
Nevertheless, Sprouse
$9,000.00

attorney's

fees

attacks
as

the

trial

"unreasonable".

court's
At

award

the

of

trial,

Sprouse's attorney, R. Clayton Huntsman, suggested, as Mr. Miles
was

preparing

stipulation

to

could

take
be

the

stand

reached

to

testify,

as to the

A A

that

perhaps

reasonableness

a

of the

fees, and told Mr. Miles to make a proffer (Tr. 162). Mr. Miles
then made the proffer that he had devoted at least 150 hours to
the case, and that his hourly rate was $60.00 an hour, and
requested the court to award attorney's fees of $9,000.00 (Tr.
162-163).

Sprouse's attorney and the court accepted the proffer

(Tr. 164; R. vol. II, p. 254).
Sprouse1s attorney did not make any objection or even desire
to cross-examine

(Tr. 164) , nor did Sprouse offer any evidence

whatsoever regarding attorney's fees.

At the conclusion of the

trial, since it was already 5:45 p.m., no oral argument was
presented
advisement

(Tr. 259) .
and

Instead, the court took the matter under

instructed

both

parties

to

file

a

written

memorandum and written closing arguments (Tr. 258). Sprouse did
not challenge the requested fees even in his written closing
argument

(R. vol. II, pp. 280-288).

Sprouse

should

not be

permitted to contest the fees for the first time on appeal.

See

Rule 103(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence; Hardy v. Hardy 776
P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Whittle 780 P.2d 819
(Utah 1989) .
About a month after the trial, Mr. Huntsman withdrew as
Sprouse's counsel

(R. vol. Ill, pp. 1-4), and after Mr. Miles

gave Sprouse the required notice to appoint new counsel or appear
in person

(R. vol. Ill, pp. 5-8), Sprouse's present counsel

entered an appearance (R. vol. Ill, pp. 11-12).
When a proffer is made and accepted by opposing counsel and
the court, the parties should be bound by the proffer.

Proffers

are useful in saving trial time, especially on those matters not

seriously disputed.

If the parties are not bound by the proffers

made and accepted, no attorney could safely make a proffer for
fear that some opposing party, or some new attorney, will raise
the matter on appeal, long after the opportunity is lost to meet
any legitimate objection that might have readily been presented
at trial.
If there had been any indication that the proffer was not
fully accepted, Mr. Miles was prepared to take the stand and
could have presented evidence establishing the legal work he had
performed, and could have shown that his work was necessary to
adequately

prosecute

the

matter,

that

his

hourly

fee

is

reasonable compared to rates charged by other attorney's in the
locality, that the case presented issues of considerable novelty
and difficulty, and that it was absolute necessary to intervene
in the action to vindicate Edmunds rights because Sprouse had
proceeded against Jager in total disregard of Edmunds rights as
the holder of a $25,000.00 assignment under the UREC.
If

the

court

on

appeal

does

not

hold

Sprouse

to

the

stipulation and proffer that his counsel accepted at trial, the
raatter should be remanded to the trial court for the opportunity
to present

the

evidence

that was

foreclosed

when

Sprouse's

counsel offered to stipulate to reasonableness and accepted the
proffer made.

But for the conduct of Sprousefs counsel, the

detailed evidence would have been presented.
Sprouse also makes a contention that the $9,000.00 award for
fees should be reduced because Mr. Miles gave an approximate
breakdown of his fees, and indicated that (1) about one-third of
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his

fees

related

counterclaim
third-party

and

to

defense

the

plaintiffs

of

counterclaims

counterclaim

Sprouse

(both Jager's

pursued

(R. vol. II, pp. 115-119);

against
(2) about

one-third of his fees related to the assertion of rights under
the "assignment" portion of the NAA, including the right to
foreclose (R. vol. I, pp. 126-134) and to share in the proceeds
from the sheriff's sale; and (3) about one-third of his fees were
related to enforcement of the "Note" portion of the NAA.
Edmunds prevailed on all three claims.
counterclaims of both Jager and Sprouse.
was dismissed

by

stipulation

He defeated the

Jagerfs counterclaim

(R. vol. II, pp. 192-195) and

Sprousefs counterclaims were tried and dismissed (see Reinstated
Findings and Judgment).

Edmunds successfully asserted his rights

under the "assignment" portion of the NAA, as the court, in
Finding 14 (R. vol. Ill, pp. 150-151) found that Edmunds held a
$25,000.00 interest in the UREC and was entitled to foreclose and
share in the proceeds from the sheriff's sale.

(Note:

Sprouse

cannot complain about the reasonableness of the $3,000.00 fees
for this part, since Sprouse's own
allowed at $3,720.50).
under the

fees for this part were

Edmunds also prevailed on his claims

"note" portion of the NAA, and the court entered

judgment for the amount due on the note.
Having prevailed on all issues, Edmunds is entitled to his
full attorney's
Edmunds

and

fees.

third-party

It was Sprouse's conduct
plaintiffs

to

incur

the

that forced
fees.

Had

Sprouse acknowledged the assigned rights Edmunds held, including

the right to participate in the foreclosure and to be paid, the
fees would likely not have been needed.
Edmunds
additional
appeal.

and

award

third-party
of

their

plaintiffs

fees

are

incurred

entitled

since

trial

to

an

and

on

Management Services v. Development Associates 617 P.2d

406 (Utah 1980) .
CONCLUSION
The

trial

court

decision

was

supported

by

competent

credible evidence, and should be affirmed in all respects.

and
This

case should be remanded to the district court with instructions
to take evidence on additional attorney's fees to be added to the
judgment for fees necessarily and reasonably incurred since trial
to defend the judgment, including reasonable attorney's fees for
this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 77^u

day of March, 1990.

-STOHN L. MILES
Attorney For Respondents
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of

the

foregoing

BRIEF

OF RESPONDENTS

to Fred

D.

Howard

and

Leslie W. Slaugh, at HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, Attorneys At Law,
120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah 84601 by first-class U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, on this J*™- day of March, 1990.
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APPENDIX ,fAM
Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law
(Entered November 5, 1987)

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY

'87 NOU 5 PD H 1H

GARY W. PENDLETON
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 East 100 South, Suite 101
St. George, Utah 84770
Ph: 628-4411

CLER!^

DEPUTY^A^W^

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON SPROUSE,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
VS.

ARJEN W. JAGER, NADA H. JAGER,
ARTIE EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS,
and JOHN DOES I through V,

Civil No. 86-0982

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on
October 14, 1987 on various motions of the parties.

Plaintiff

appeared by and through his attorney, Gary W. Pendleton, and
Defendant Edmunds appeared by and through his attorney, John L.
Miles and Defendants Arjen W. Jager and Nada H. Jager appeared by
and through their attorney, Terry L. Wade.

No appearances were

made by any other named Defendant in person or through counsel.
The Court having reviewed the file and having heard
arguments and having denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on the
theory that judicial foreclosure was unavailable in these
proceedings; and the Court having heard the statements of counsel
and having taken testimony regarding the extent of the claim in
foreclosure and reasonable attorney's fees associated with the
foreclosure thereof and being fully advised in the premises now
1
Q2

makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. By contract dated March 29, 1985 Defendant Arjen W.
Jager contracted to purchased real property commonly known as the
Oasis Motel from Plaintiff.
2. Defendant Arjen W. Jager did not make the monthly
installment payment due June 1, 1986 under the terms of the
subject Uniform Real Estate Contract nor has he made any
subsequent monthly installment payment which have fallen due
since Junef 1986.
3. Defendants Jager have now vacated the subject
property.
4. Defendant Nada H. Jager's interest in the subject
real property arises out of a Quit-Claim Deed dated April 1,
1985, executed by Defendant Arjen W. Jager and recorded in the
office of the Washington County Recorder on June 21, 1986.
5. Defendant Lloyd Walters has not filed an Answer to
the Summons and Complaint served upon him in connection with the
above-entitled proceedings and his default is appropriately
entered.
6. The principal unpaid obligation amounts to
$386/275.13 and the interest accruing from the date of the last
payment to this date is $59,542.42 with late charges of
$1^358*50»
7. Unpaid property taxes accruing through the term of
Defendant's possession amount to $9,164.95.
2

93

8. The underlying Uniform Real Estate Contract contains
a provision allowing the Seller and assigns to recover attorney's
fees in foreclosure proceedings.
9. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney's fees
in the amount of $15,000.00 incurred in the enforcement of his
rights and the foreclosure of Defendant Arjen W. Jager's rights
in the subject property.
10. Defendant Artie Edmunds is entitled to attorney's
fees in the amount of $1,500.00 incurred in the enforcement of
rights and the foreclosure of Defendant Arjen W. Jager's rights
in the subject property.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiff and assigns, if any, are entitled to a
Judgment and Decree foreclosing Defendant Arjen W. Jager's
interest in the subject real property.
2. The interest of Nada H. Jager in the subject real
property is inferior and subordinate to the lien which is hereby
foreclosed.
3. The interest of Defendant Lloyd Walters has been
extinguished by his default.
4. Plaintiff and Defendant Edmunds are entitled to an
award of attorney's

3

fees.
LET JUDGMENT BE RENDERED ACCORDINGLY.
VCCORDINGL:
DATED this ^L^

day of ©e^ofeer, 1987

)istrict

Approved as to Form and Content:
Jcrtfn L. Miles
Attorney for Edmunds

Terry^L, Wade
Attorney for Jagers

APPENDIX "B"
Judgment And Decree Of Foreclosure
(Entered November 5, 1987)

_ / I F T H DISTRICT COURT
WASK"-:GTC;! COUNTY

'87 NOU 5 PP1 H 1 3

GARY W. PENDLETON
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 East 100 South, Suite 101
St. George, Utah 84770
Ph: 628-4411

CLERK

________

OEPUTY3S_2______1

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON SPROUSE,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE
OF FORECLOSURE

vs.
ARJEN W. JAGER, NADA H. JAGER,
ARTIE EDMUNDS, LLOYD WALTERS,
and JOHN DOES I through V,

Civil No. 86-0982

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on
October 14, 1987 on various motions of the parties.

Plaintiff

appeared by and through his attorney, Gary W. Pendleton, and
Defendant Edmunds appeared by and through his attorney, John L.
Miles and Defendants Arjen W. Jager and Nada H. Jager appeared by
and through their attorney, Terry L. Wade.

No appearances were

made by any other named Defendant in person or through counsel.
The Court having reviewed the file and having heard
arguments and having denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the
theory that judicial foreclosure was unavailable in these
proceedings; and the Court having heard the statements of counsel
and having taken testimony regarding the extent of the claim in
foreclosure and reasonable attorney's fees associated with the
foreclosure thereof and being fully advised in the premises;

•*Jiv

1

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff have
Judgment against Defendant Arjen W. Jager in the principal amount
of $386,275.13, together with interest in the amount of
$59/542.42, late fees of $884.40, attorney's fees in the amount
of $16,500.00, court costs in the amount of $106.50, and unpaid
property taxes in the amount of $9,164.95 for a total Judgment of
$472,473.40, together with after-accruing costs, said Judgment to
bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from and after the
date of the execution hereof, until paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that that certain Uniform Real
Estate Contract dated March 29, 1985 by and between Plaintiff as
Seller and Defendant Arjen W. Jager as purchaser is hereby
ordered foreclosed, and the property described therein and
hereinafter described shall be sold as provided by law at
Sheriff's Sale, the proceeds of said sale shall be applied to the
payment of the Judgment set forth above and described.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the proceeds of said sale
shall be paid over the Clerk of Washington County, State of Utah,
to be held and deposited by said Court and to be distributed only
by further order of this Court following an adjudication of
claims asserted in Defendant Jager's Counterclaim and claims
existing between Plaintiff and Defendant Artie Edmunds.

It is

further contemplated that additional claims may be asserted as a
result of the intervention of Interwest Properties and others and
it is the order of this Court that all funds remain on deposit
with the Clerk pending adjudication of those claims as well as
2
Q1?

any additional claims Plaintiff may assert against Defendant
Artie Edmunds following the amendment of any pleadings on file
herein.

The Clerk of the Court is hereby authorized and directed

to deposit said funds in an interest bearing account,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Plaintiff's vendor's lien is superior to and has priority over
any interest of Defendant Nada H. Jager and Defendant Lloyd
Walters.
The real property effected by this Judgment and Decree
of Foreclosure is situated in Washington Countyf State of Utah,
and is more particularly described as follows:
The East one-half (El/2) of Lot 6, and all of Lot
7, in Block 23, Plat "A", St. George City Survey,
less the following, to wit:
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of said Lot 7
and running thence West 198 feet, thence South 86
feet to the point of beginning.
Nothing in this Judgment or Decree of Foreclosure shall
be construed to act as an adjudication upon the merits of any of
the above-mentioned claims existing between the parties other
than Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Arjen W. Jager for
foreclosure of the Uniform Real Estate Contract as a note and
mortgage and the claims of Defendant Nada H. Jager and Defendant
Lloyd Walters whose interest in the subject property will
necessarily be extinguished by the sale of the property upon
foreclosure.

The Court furthermore reserves the power to modify

any award of attorney's fees at the time of the resolution and

3

disposition of the claims remaining unadjudicated,
DATED this £ —

day of QefcotreT, 1987.
C&CS&4—

jy P h i l i p Evj
d i s t r i c t Jucrae
Approved as t o Form and Content:
in L, Miles
Attorney for Edmunds

^ P

0, I Hint-

Terry £ . Wade"
Attorney for Jagers
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APPENDIX "C"
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 24
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